Deconstructing the Third Front

Deconstructing the ternion reckonDaniel Steven BressnerAfter decades spent cultivating economic growth along its easternern seaboard, the PRCs western interior is rapidly developing. In Sichuan province, Chengdu al nonpareil is now home to over 1,000 U.S. companies including General Electric and Mazda.1 However, one of the most overambitious efforts to industrialize western China actually took place decades earlier. In a sweeping project known as the trio bowel movement, central government planners reconfigured the prudence of western provinces, with a special emphasis on defense industrialization. This paper provides an overview of the inter issue factors that led to the creation of the thirdly Front and its key projects. Furthermore, it analyzes the economic strategies apply by the Chinese government during this period to complete these projects.BackgroundThe terzetto Front, or da sanxian, derives its name from a development concept put frontwards Mao confidant Lin Biao , who became Minister of Defense in 1959. In a speech in 1962 known as the 7,000 Cadres Conference, Lin pushed for the military fortification of Anhui commonwealth as a safety measure in case the government needed to retreat from its eastern seaboard.2 While China faced a numberless of inter issue crises during the 1960s, Lins speech was most concerned with a possible attack on mainland Chinese cities by Kuomintang (KMT) forces in the aftermath of the Great bounciness Forward. In 1964, Mao himself played in active role in revising the 3rd Five Year Plan so that it would emphasize national defense.3 The final version highlighted the threat of looming war and called for increased development in transport infrastructure, science and technology, and national defense.4While Lin was cerebrateed on the KMT, Maos preoccupation was the growing American military presence in Southeast Asia. China scholar Barry Naughton is one of the leading researchers on the political economy of the trey Front. He identifies the Gulf of Tonkin incident, and subsequent start of the Vietnam War, as the primary catalyst for the acceleration of the deuce-ace Front development strategy.5 From 1964 to 1971, the combination of defense concerns over the KMT, unify States, and Soviet Union all created an environment politically conducive to intensive defense development.Structure Key ProjectsThe primary objective of the Third Front was leaven an entirely self-sufficient industrial base that China could rely on in the event of war. If eastern coastal cities like Shanghai were attacked, the area surround Suzhou could work as a Second Front. A massive stretch of mountainous terrain that included parts of Guizhou, Qinghai, Gansu, Yunnan and Sichuan provinces would serve as the Third Front.6 Chinas nascent thermonuclear weapons program, including the Lanzhou Gaseous Diffusion Plant, also fell under the territory designated as the Third Front.7 Figure 1 illustrates the geographic regions of the project.Fig. 1 The regions of the Third Front grouped by phase. Source Naughton, The Third Front, 354.While there were several high-profile projects in the first phase of the Third Front, which lasted until 1969, this paper emphasizes the creation of fare ne twainrks in the region that revolutionized how resources were moved across western China. Naughton claims that the Panzhihua iron and steel complex was the keystone of the Third Front.8 Maos own statements during the 1960s keep up this view. In 1964, Mao told a meeting of the Communist Partys Central Committee Unless Panzhihua Steel Plant is fully highly-developed, I cannot go to rest period at night. If there is no Panzhihua Steel Plant, I will have to ride a donkey to my meetings.9 However, this project could not exist without the development of check infrastructure. Development was accelerated on rail lines in the southwest, with the Chongqing-Guiyang and Chengdu-Kunming lines, completed in 1965 and 1970 respectively, being the most important in linking the region together. The Chengdu-Kunming line alone personify 3.3 billion yuan, or nearly 21% of the national budget for capital aspect in 1965.10 The first phase of the Panzhihua complex address an estimated 3.74 billion yuan.11The factories and pains serviced by this new rail network were brought into the region using a strategy known as yi fen wei er, or one divided into two, which Naughton likens to an economic mitosis.12 Tsinghua University students Bin Xu and Linxing Xiao use the Panzhihua complex as an example to demonstrate how this concept worked. If there were two sets of equipment, move one to Panzhihua. If there was only one set, move it to Panzhihua.13 This idea was replicated for manpower, technical know-how, and financial enthronisation from across China. Factories on Chinas eastern seaboard would send a significant piece of their resources to the southwest and be left responsible for making up the difference in capability, w hereas the newly transplanted western workforce received additional state investiture to accelerate development. Figure 2 shows the massive spike of state investment in Sichuan province following the prioritization of Panzhihua after 1964.Fig 2 State investment into Sichuan province from 1964 to 1972. Source China Geo-Explorer, All China Data Center, http// chinawaredataonline.org/cgepublic/cityclient33/.The randomness phase of the Third Front, lasting from 1969 to 1972, occurred under the shadow of continually deteriorating relations with the USSR. The focus of the second phase was on machine building, with its centerpiece project being the No. 2 Automobile Plant in Shiyang, in Hubei provinces northwest region.14 Reflecting the security concerns of the central government, additional plants in the area were hidden deep in mountain valleys and even caves to minimize potential damage from airstrikes. trinity critical rail lines were constructed during this period in order to facili tate the transit of labor and material resources the Luoyang-Yangtze, Hunan-Guizhou, and Chongqing to Wuhan (via Ankang) connections.15 The Third Fronts national significance, and level of national investment, was as high as 45% in 1966, but dropped again as the decade came to a close.16 The bestow proportion of national investment into the Third Front during the Fourth Five-Year Plan, from 1971-75, was 41.1%.17 From 1971 onwards, changes in the larger political environment lead to a dismantling of many of the Third Fronts ongoing construction operations. Domestically, the fall of program architect Lin Biao played a role. However, more important was the softening and eventual normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States, whose previous cognizance as a strategic threat was a major justification for the entire Third Front.Impact and LegacyEconomic data on the total government investment during the Third Front is difficult to calculate, in part because projects that f ell under the militarys jurisdiction, like development of the Chinese nuclear program, were not included alongside regular construction data. C.Z. Lin, drawing from anonymous Chinese sources, estimates that total investment was 200 billion yuan.18 The two largest companies to have developed out of the Third Front era are Panzhihua Steel and Dongfeng Motor Corporation, the latter of which stems from Shiyangs Automobile Plant No 2. Dongfeng, Chinas second largest automobile producer, posted a 2012 net income of $1.3 billion USD. Swedish automobile firm Volvo bought a 45% stake in the company the following year.19 one(a) of the lasting positive legacies of the Third Front era is the existence of rail infrastructure across Chinas western provinces, which were an inevitable step off in linking the regions economy with the rest of the country. Despite this, the way in which these projects were undertaken dramatically inflated their costs and misallocated resources. Historian Robert Clive r notes that the decision to make Third Front rail lines a priority above all others diverted progress from the rest of the countrys national rail network. The result was that cost per kilometer of rail infrastructure on Third Front projects was five to six times the national average.20 The largest source of developmental issues within the Third Front likely came not from the sheer cost of the project, or even from its remote location. While these were serious issues, the construction principle of sanbian, or what Naughton identifies as three concurrent, was the most damaging.21 This concept of simultaneously designing a site, constructing it, and producing from it ensured that proper site planning was often not conducted. More importantly, it led to additional costs from avertible errors that slowed down overall production. An additional 40 million yuan was pumped into the Chengdu-Kunming rail line from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s to provide the manpower necessary to determin e track deficiencies.22If the Third Front era is judged purely on whether it made China more prepared for war with the U.S. or the Soviet Union, it can be regarded as successfully accomplishing its key objectives. It spurred investment into Chinas mountainous west, led to the fortification of industrial sites, and generally created an economic base designed to deport an extended war on the mainland. It fulfilled the purposefully vague objective set out in the State Planning Commissions Third Five Year Plan, which sought to strengthen national defense and make breakthroughs in technology.23However, the Third Front development strategy was based on short-term strategic concerns at the cost of long-term economic growth. Projects with flawed designs and the drawing away of wealth from Chinas eastern seaboard made the Third Front an undeniable economic failure. Naughton draws on statistical analysis conducted by Chinese economist Chen Dongsheng to illustrate the misallocation of resourc es that drew growth away from the east coast. Using Chens data, Naughton estimates that Chinas industrial output is 10-15% below what it would have been if the Third Front had never been undertaken.24 Thus, while the Third Front was an economically unviable project that placed a heavy burden on the Chinese economy, it demonstrates how seriously Mao took the perceived strategic encirclement the country was liner from the United States, Republic of China forces, and the Soviet Union. Further analysis of the Third Front is a valuable endeavor for those studying both Chinas economy and the history of its international relations.Works CitedBramall, Chris. Chinese Economic Development. London Routledge, 2008.China Internet Information Center. The Third Five-year Plan (1966-1970). China.org.cn. Last modify may twenty-first 2007, http//www.china.org.cn/ position/MATERIAL/157608.htm.Cliver, Robert. Third Front Policy. In the Berkshire Encyclopedia of China, edited by Linsun Cheng, Kerry B rown, Winberg Chai, Xiejun Chen, and Karen Christensen, 2244-2247. Great Barrington Berkshire Publishing Group, 2009.Dickie, Lance. Sichuan A Land of Abundance and Opportunities. The Seattle Times, January 21st 2014. http//blogs.seattletimes.com/opinionnw/2014/01/21/sichuan-a-land-of-abundance-and-opportunities/Lin, C.Z. Employment implications of defence cutbacks in China. In Defense Expenditure, Industrial Conversion, and Local Employment, edited by Liba Paukert, 189-204. Geneva International Labor Office, 1991.Mohanty, Deba R. The Chinese security Dilemma in the 1950s and 1960s Story of the Third Front. Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, January 17th 2011. http//www.idsa-india.org/an-jan-4.html.Naughton, Barry. The Third Front Defense Industrialization in the Chinese Interior. The China Quarterly 115, September (1988) 351-386.Pike, John. Lanzhou Chinese Nuclear Forces. Federation of American Scientists. Last modified May 12th 2000, http//www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/ q uick-wittedness/lanzhou.htm.Tejada, Carlos. Truck Maker Volvo Sets Alliance to Enter China. The besiege Street Journal, January 27th 2013. http//online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324039504578264611071184722.Xu, Bin and Linxing Xiao. Planning and Construction History of Panzhihua during the Three-Front Strategy Period Backgrounds, Process, and Mechanism. (paper presented at the 15th International Historical Planning Society, Sao Paolo, Brazil, July 15th-18th, 2009).Page 11Lance Dickie, Sichuan A Land of Abundance and Opportunities, The Seattle Times, last modified January 21st 2014, http//blogs.seattletimes.com/opinionnw/2014/01/21/sichuan-a-land-of-abundance-and-opportunities/2 Deba R. Mohanty, The Chinese Security Dilemma in the 1950s and 1960s Story of the Third Front, Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, January 17th 2011.3 Barry Naughton, The Third Front Defense Industrialization in the Chinese Interior, The China Quarterly 115, September (1988) 353.4 The Thi rd Five-year Plan (1966-1970), China Internet Information Center China.org.cn, last modified May 21st 2007, http//www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/157608.htm.5 Naughton, The Third Front, 369.6 Naughton, The Third Front, 354.7 John Pike, Lanzhou Chinese Nuclear Forces, Federation of American Scientists, last modified May 12th 2000, http//www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/facility/lanzhou.htm.8 Naughton, The Third Front, 357.9 Chris Bramall, Chinese Economic Development (London Routledge, 2008), 268.10 Naughton, The Third Front, 358.11 Ibid.12 Ibid., 356.13 Bin Xu and Linxing Xiao, Planning and Construction History of Panzhihua During the Three-Front Strategy Period Backgrounds, Process, and Mechanism (paper presented at the 15th International Historical Planning Society, Sao Paolo, Brazil, July 15th-18th, 2009).14 Robert Cliver, Third Front Policy, in the Berkshire Encyclopedia of China, ed. by Linsun Cheng et al. (Great Barrington Berkshire Publishing Group, 2009) 2246.15 Naughton, Th e Third Front, 359.16 C.Z Lin, Employment implications of defence cutbacks in China, in Defense Expenditure, Industrial Conversion, and Local Employment, ed. by Liba Paukert (Geneva International Labor Office, 1991) 202.17 Naughton, The Third Front, 365.18 Lin, Employment implications of defence cutbacks in China, 201.19 Carlos Tejada, Truck Maker Volvo Sets Alliance to Enter China, The Wall Street Journal, January 27th 2013, http//online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324039504578264611071184722.20 Cliver, Third Front Policy, 2247.21 Naughton, The Third Front, 376.22 Naughton, The Third Front, 376.23 The Third Five-year Plan (1966-1970), China Internet Information Center China.org.cn, last modified May 21st 2007, http//www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/157608.htm.24 Naughton, The Third Front, 379.